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A B S T R A C T
Support for European integration is a function no longer only
of ‘hard’ economic and utilitarian predictors but also of ‘soft’
predictors such as feelings of identity and attitudes towards
immigrants. Focusing on the issue of the potential member-
ship of Turkey in the European Union (EU), this study demon-
strates that the importance of ‘soft’ predictors outweighs the
role of ‘hard’ predictors in understanding public opinion
about Turkish membership. The study draws on survey data
(N = 1630) and applies a series of regression models and
structural equation modelling to show in addition how the
effects of utilitarian considerations are mediated through
‘soft’ indicators, further accentuating the importance of
identity considerations and anti-immigration sentiments. The
findings are discussed in the light of public support for and
the legitimacy of further European enlargement.
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In a nutshell, explanations of support for European integration have
developed from a focus on primarily ‘hard’ economic and utilitarian pre-
dictors to ‘soft’ predictors such as feelings of identity and attitudes towards
immigrants. During the initial years of European collaboration, ‘permissive
consensus’ was dominant and there was little interest in public opinion and
in understanding public support for integration. Later, variation in public
support was largely seen as a function of utilitarian and cost/benefit consider-
ations (Gabel, 1998). With the progress of integration and the decline of public
support, there has been an increasing awareness of ‘soft’ predictors for under-
standing (a lack of) support. Feelings of identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2005;
McLaren, 2002) and fear of immigration (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005)
have become parts of the explanations of public opinion.
On the topic of the potential membership of Turkey in the EU, both sets
of considerations conceivably play a role. The issue has been framed by politi-
cal elites and the media as both an economic issue (e.g. labour migration,
subsidies going to Turkey) and an issue of European identity, safety and
values (De Vreese et al., 2006; Koenig et al., 2006). We hypothesize that ‘soft’
considerations will be of greater importance for understanding variation in
public support for Turkish membership. We also assume that the impacts of
utilitarian considerations are indirect and mediated through immigration-
related considerations. This has implications for future investigations of
public support for the issue of Turkish membership in particular and
European integration in general. The EU opened negotiations with Turkey in
October 2005. These negotiations are ongoing and complicated. Public
opinion is expected to be crucial for the negotiations because public accept-
ance of the negotiation outcome, either in the indirect form of parliamentary
support or directly through public opinion or a referendum, is necessary.
EU support: From hard to soft predictors
The question of why some people embrace the notion of European inte-
gration whereas others oppose it has generated a considerable number of
studies. Understanding variation has been explained in terms of cognitive
mobilization (e.g. Inglehart, 1970), utilitarian and economic considerations
(e.g. Gabel and Palmer, 1995) and satisfaction with the incumbent govern-
ment (e.g. Franklin et al., 1995; Ray, 2003), as well as sociodemographic
characteristics and political-ideological preferences (e.g. Gabel, 1998). More
recent explanations include feelings of national identity (Christin and
Trechsel, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Marks and Hooghe, 2003), national
pride and territorial identity (Carey, 2002), perceived cultural threat
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(McLaren, 2002) and fear of immigration (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005).
We briefly address each of these explanations and utilize most of these in our
model for explaining support for Turkish membership in the EU.
Several studies have pointed to the relevance of ‘hard’, economic
considerations for understanding support for the EU. Macroeconomics (such
as inflation and unemployment) may matter (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton,
1993), but microeconomics, focusing on how some people benefit from
European integration while others do not, have proven more important
(Gabel, 1998). In particular, the ‘subjective utilitarian model’ suggests that
European integration is supported if perceptions and future evaluations of
the economy are positive.
Extant research has also demonstrated that ‘Euro-opinions’ are to a
considerable extent a product of citizens resorting to proxies when formulat-
ing their view on integration. These proxies typically stem from the national
political arena (Anderson, 1998; Franklin et al., 1994). In particular the impor-
tance of government approval of and support for incumbent political parties
has been considered. When a pro-European government, for example, calls a
referendum on an issue of European integration, supporters of that govern-
ment are more likely to follow in favour of a pro-European proposition
(Franklin et al., 1994; Franklin et al., 1995).
Inglehart (1970) proposed that citizens with higher levels of cognitive
skills would be more at ease with a supranational entity. This was extended
to suggest that those with a political value system favouring non-material
values (such as self-fulfilment and concerns with democracy) above material
values (such as financial security) would be more favourable towards
European integration (Inglehart, 1977). Later analyses found only limited
support for this idea, either by reducing the argument to the original member
states only (Anderson and Reichert, 1996) or by controlling for a number of
the explanations outlined here (e.g. Gabel, 1998).
In recent years there has been an increasing scholarly interest in
antecedents of attitudes towards European integration stemming from 
non-economic, non-party political preferences. This interest in ‘soft’ expla-
nations co-occurs with at least two important developments. First, the nature
of the ‘European project’ has changed in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty,
which set out a path of far-reaching economic and also political cooperation,
much of which took effect in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time,
a growing number of citizens across Europe started to express reluctance
about further integration, a change in public support later coined as Euro-
scepticism, which marked the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ during which
most citizens seemed to (quietly) accept advances in integration decided by
political elites.
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Indeed, the change in the (perceived) nature of the integration project has
made several considerations applicable when understanding variation in
support for EU issues. Citizens’ feelings of national attachment and their
perceptions of threats to the nation-state and to the nation’s interests and
cultural integrity have been shown to matter (Kritzinger, 2003). Marks and
Hooghe (2003) differentiate between cultural and economic threats and, when
controlling for economic evaluations, find these to have a significant impact
on EU support. McLaren (2002) argues that reluctance about integration is a
function of the perceived cultural threat and it has been shown how the
perceived threat of immigration can fuel public anti-EU integration senti-
ments (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005).
In the case of potential Turkish membership of the EU, given the multi-
faceted nature of the issue, it can be expected that economic, utilitarian
considerations apply as well as a number of questions concerning feelings of
national identity and ways of thinking about foreigners. In a study on public
attitudes towards Turkish membership, McLaren (2007) demonstrated how
group interests outweigh economic self-interests when it comes to consider-
ing Turkish membership. This relationship is conditioned by context, more
precisely by the threat of immigration, so that the group considerations weigh
even more strongly in contexts with higher levels of immigration.
In this study, we corroborate previous work and suggest that the issue
of Turkish membership shifts the emphasis of the ingredients of public
opinion towards ‘softer’ identity-, threat- and immigration-related consider-
ations. We extend this work by arguing that the impacts of ‘harder’ utilitarian
considerations also partially operate through soft considerations. In technical
terms, we expect a partial mediation effect (e.g. Baron and Kenny, 1986) by
which economic considerations operate both independently to shape public
opinion and through the relationship with anti-immigration sentiments. We
base this expectation of a mediated relationship on the extensive literature on
anti-immigration attitudes, which demonstrates how negative economic
evaluations fuel such sentiments and behaviour (e.g. Citrin et al., 1997;
Quillian, 1995; Sniderman et al., 2000; Sniderman et al., 2004)
Hypotheses
Our first goal is to demonstrate that, on the issue of Turkish membership of
the EU, which has implications in the realms of politics, economics and
culture, we can expect many factors to matter for understanding the variation
in public support. When reviewing established factors explaining support for
the EU, a shift of emphasis from rather hard economic factors (e.g. Gabel,
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1998) to softer identity-related factors (e.g. McLaren, 2002, 2007) is evident in
the literature. Therefore, we explicitly expect the importance of ‘soft’ expla-
nations to outweigh the importance of ‘hard’ explanations (Hypothesis 1).
This expectation is augmented by the importance of feelings of identity and
the relevance of immigration-related sentiments. Given that Turkey would
become the largest member of the EU, individuals with non-inclusive feelings
of identity are likely to oppose membership of an entity of this magnitude,
and also because of religious considerations and perceived cultural incom-
patibility. Similarly, individuals who are reluctant about immigration are
likely to oppose membership given the potential access of Turkish citizens to
current EU member states.
Our second goal is to demonstrate that the effect of utilitarian con-
siderations is partially mediated through anti-immigration sentiments
(Hypothesis 2). We expect this to be the case on the basis of previous research
and because (a) negative economic expectations are related to anti-
immigration sentiments and (b) Turkey in the EU is seen as a vehicle for
increased immigration.
Based on extant research, as outlined above, a positive relationship
between support for Turkish membership and gender (male), age, education,
income, knowledge and post-materialism should be provable. Individuals
with a right-wing ideological preference should be less supportive of Turkish
membership than individuals with a centrist ideological preference. We
assume that support for Turkish EU membership is positively related to
favourable evaluations of the incumbent government and positive evaluations
of the economy. Economic evaluations and government support have been
found to be interrelated (Wearing et al., 2000). The power of these hard factors
in support for further European integration is, as outlined above, well estab-
lished in relation to both EU enlargements and various European policy areas.
We finally test the impact of exclusive national identity and fear of immigration
on support for Turkish membership and expect both to be negatively related
to support. The last two predictors are considered ‘soft’ predictors. This makes
sense in the light of the EU moving from being a more or less exclusively
economic union to nowadays incorporating cultural and social policy.
The interest of this article is twofold. First, we seek to demonstrate the
overriding importance of soft factors, replacing the explanatory value of hard
factors, in EU support. Second, we argue that hard and socio-demographic
factors have not become irrelevant in explanatory models, but that their
influence on EU support is to a large degree mediated through the soft
explanatory variables. We conclude that in modelling the factors influencing
EU support we need to take into account soft factors and to realize that
modelling is maybe less straightforward than it is usually presented.
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Methods
To test our hypotheses while adequately controlling for other influences, we
cannot rely on the most readily available data (the Eurobarometer) because a
number of the key concepts are either not included in the barometer or poorly
operationalized. EB 66 is the EB data set that comes closest to being appro-
priate since it contains questions about citizens’ support for Turkey’s enlarge-
ment of the EU and a number of other relevant measures. However, it does
not include key variables tapping post-materialism or government support,
and it includes only one inadequate question on immigration sentiments. We
therefore collected new data to test the antecedents of public support for
Turkish EU membership, the importance of ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ predictors and
their mediated influences. The trade-off is that we can focus on one country
only. Our study was conducted in the Netherlands against the backdrop of
an EU Council summit in December 2004. Here, leaders of the European
Union met to discuss whether Turkey met the political criteria that were set
out as preconditions for entry to the EU and to agree upon a date to start
negotiation talks.1
The survey was fielded four weeks before the summit.2 A net sample of
1630 respondents participated, which produced a response rate, computed
according to AAPOR definition Response Rate 1, of .74. The survey was web-
administered and respondents were drawn from a representative database of
approximately 55,000 members of the Dutch population. The database reflects
the Dutch population, with computers and Internet access being provided to
non-computer owners. Correspondence between our sample and population
data from the Central Bureau of Statistics for a number of sociodemographic
variables, such as age, gender and education, is satisfactory. Descriptive infor-
mation regarding the sociodemographic composition of the sample is
provided in Table 3 in the Appendix.
The dependent variable is attitude towards Turkish EU membership,
measured by asking respondents ‘How do you think about possible member-
ship of Turkey in the European Union?’ Answers were given on a five-point
scale ranging from ‘very negative’ to ‘very positive’.3 The independent vari-
ables include gender (1 = female), age (in years), education (coded into six
categories ranging from low to high) and household income (coded into four
categories running from low to high). Further, we measured ideological pref-
erences (dummies for left and right, with middle as reference category),
support for post-materialist values (materialist low, post-materialist high) and
political sophistication (a weighted additive index of political knowledge and
political interest). We included questions tapping evaluations of the economy
and the government (five-point scales, with high being positive) and whether
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respondents held an exclusive Dutch identity (dummy), and we used a six-
item measure for anti-immigration sentiment. Question wordings, means and
standard deviations (SD) for all items, as well as scale reliabilities, are reported
in Table A1 in the Appendix. The range of all variables was standardized and
we report unstandardized coefficients.
Data analysis
Our first interest is to assess the relative contribution of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’
predictors of support for Turkish EU enlargement. To test our hypothesis we
employ a series of regression models successively adding new explanatory
variables, thereby assessing the explanatory value of each of the models and
the improvement of the model when introducing new variables. We report
the percentage of variance explained for each model and test for the signifi-
cance of increases in explained variance. The first model (A) accounts for
sociodemographic predictors, and the second model (B) adds ‘traditional’
explanations such as ideology and political sophistication. The third model
(C) then accounts for ‘hard’ explanations such as economic evaluations and
an assessment of the incumbent government. For a comparison of the
explained variance, the fourth model (D) includes, alongside sociodemo-
graphic and traditional explanations, only ‘soft’ explanations such as holding
post-materialist values and an exclusive national identity and attitudes
towards immigration. The final model (E) includes all established predictors
and allows a comparison of the contribution of the different variables to the
explained variance in support.
Our second assumption is that the effects of sociodemographic,
traditional and hard predictors are, at least partly, mediated by the more
recent soft factors. We assess this by using structural equation modelling. The
model that is presented reflects the theoretical considerations outlined above
and was computed using Amos 5.0. To assess the model fit, we report the
comparative fit index (CFI), the parsimony-adjusted comparative fit index
(PCFI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).4
Results
First, we look at the importance of more recent soft explanatory factors of 
EU support compared with the more established traditional and hard factors.
We start with a very simple model incorporating only sociodemographic
variables as explanatory factors for supporting Turkish accession to the EU
(Table 1, Model A). As expected, education has a strongly significant positive
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influence on public support, with those who are more highly educated being
more likely to support Turkish EU accession. Furthermore, also in line with
our expectations, we find men to be more supportive than women. Age and
income are not substantially related to support. The explanatory power of the
model is very low, explaining only 1.4% of the variation in the dependent
variable.
In the second model (Table 1, Model B), we add political sophistication
and ideology. Whereas the former shows no relationship with the dependent
variable, a right-wing ideological outlook in particular has a strong and
negative influence on support for Turkish accession. Left ideology has only a
marginal but positive impact on support. Including these measures somewhat
reduces the impact of education, and income becomes a marginally significant
predictor. The explanatory power of the model rises to almost 6%, which is
significant but still not impressive. The traditional explanatory factors do not
exercise strong influences and do not perform well in explaining support for
Turkish EU membership.
In the next model (Table 1, Model C) we add government assessments
and evaluations of the economy as so-called ‘hard’ predictors to the model.
It becomes evident that economic evaluations are by far the most important
of the newly added variables in the model, with people having a positive
evaluation of the economy being more likely to support Turkish EU 
accession. Government evaluations contribute somewhat strongly as an
explanatory factor, with people thinking well of the government being more
supportive. The most important predictor in the model, however, remains
right-wing ideology. Including the hard variables further decreases the impact
of education, and renders income insignificant again. The explanatory power
of the model rises significantly to almost 10%.
In the next step (Table 1, Model D) we test the impact of the soft factors,
but leaving out the hard factors of government and economic evaluations.
First, we note that the explanatory power of the model now significantly
increases to 22%, thereby performing substantially better than the previous
model(s). Anti-immigration attitudes far exceed the power of any other
variable in the model. People who think negatively about immigrants and
immigration are much more likely to oppose Turkish accession to the EU.
However, holding an exclusive Dutch identity is also a strong negative pre-
dictor of support. Including these variables substantially decreases the impact
of right-wing ideology, which, however, is still a significant negative factor.
The last two steps in the model-building process tentatively suggest that the
direct effects of variables such as education, income and ideology are at least
partly mediated through evaluations of the economy and anti-immigration
attitudes.
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We now turn towards a test of the full model incorporating all indepen-
dent variables (Table 1, Model E). Clearly, anti-immigration attitudes, holding
an exclusive national identity and economic evaluations turn out to be the
strongest explanatory factors in the model. Right-wing ideology and to a lesser
degree government evaluations and post-materialism are significant factors
explaining support for Turkish EU accession. Interestingly though, adding
economic and government evaluations to the previous model (Model D) raises
the explanatory power of the model by only 2%, to approximately 24%. In
contrast, adding the soft predictors to the hard model (Model C) caused a rise
of 14% in explained variance. This is a strong indication that the soft factors
are considerably stronger predictors of support.5
One might suspect that this strong effect of anti-immigration sentiments
is owing to the fact that we employ support for Turkish membership in the
EU as dependent variable, which is a policy where identity and immigration
concerns arguably play a stronger role. This concern is only partly relevant,
though. When using a measure of general support for European integration
as the dependent variable, we find the relationships shown here largely
confirmed (see Table A2 in the Appendix).6 Although economic and govern-
ment evaluations play a stronger role in general EU support than for Turkish
EU accession, we still find holding an exclusive national identity and anti-
immigration attitudes to be the most important predictors of general support.
Do these results indicate that the more traditional factors and hard vari-
ables are rather irrelevant for explaining EU support today? Not necessarily,
since, as we argue here, their influence might be to a large degree mediated
through the soft variables. We test this proposition by means of structural
equation modelling techniques. Based on the results of the ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions, the theoretical considerations outlined above and
a pragmatic model modification indication, we estimated the model shown in
Figure 1 (only hard and soft factors shown here). We find that, similar to the
regression models, only five of the measures have a significant influence on
support: economic evaluations, exclusive national identity, post-materialism,
right-wing ideology and – again the strongest predictor – anti-immigration
sentiments. There are, however, also substantial relations between the differ-
ent explanatory variables employed in the model. Rather than having a 
direct effect on support, government evaluations affect evaluations of the
economy, which in turn influence support. Economic considerations, however,
are also strongly related to anti-immigration sentiments, so that part of the
impact of the hard factors is indeed mediated through the soft factor of anti-
immigration sentiment. Furthermore, identity is a strong predictor of 
anti-immigration sentiments, but at the same time is strongly related directly
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to support. Besides right-wing ideology, none of the traditional variables
shows a direct effect on support in the full model.
So did, for instance, education become irrelevant in explanations of EU
support? The list of effects shown in Table 2 confirms that some of the hypoth-
esized direct effects were refuted by the OLS analysis, because they are
mediated through other variables. We focus here on those variables that do
not have a direct effect on support, but that are shown to have an indirect
effect, mediated through other variables. For instance, whereas left-wing
ideology has no direct effect on support for Turkish EU accession, its effect is
mediated through a range of other factors, in particular identity, immigration
attitudes and post-materialism, which yield a considerable total effect of left
identity. Similarly, traditional accounts explaining EU support emphasize the
role of education and, when considering total effects, education is positively
related to support. Its influence, however, is again mediated through, in
particular, anti-immigration sentiments and national identity. Whereas right-
wing ideology still has a direct effect on support, a substantial part of its total
effect is also mediated through anti-immigration concerns. In sum, traditional
De Vreese et al. Hard and Soft 5 2 1
Government
support Postmaterialism
National identity
Economic
evaluations
Turkey in EU
support
N = 1630; DF = 95
CMIN = 354.7
CMIN/DF = 3.73
CFI = .961
PCFI = .671
RMSEA = .041
PCLOSE = 1
Anti-
immigration
sentiments
.24 .06
.14
–.12
–.34
.36
–.22
Figure 1 Hard and soft factors influencing support for Turkish EU members.
factors do still matter, but to a substantial degree their impact is mediated by
the soft variables.
Discussion
Public opinion on European integration has become salient for both the
research and the political agendas in recent years. Following the No outcomes
of two referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Nether-
lands and a general increase in Euroscepticism across Europe (see Hooghe
and Marks, 2007), there is increased interest in understanding the antecedents
of support for and scepticism about advanced integration. In the literature,
multiple explanations of public support coexist. The relevance of different
predictors has changed over time as the European integration project itself
has changed. This observation is shared by recent analyses of European public
opinion that have also stressed a variety of explanations rooted in feelings of
identity, perceived cultural threat and fear of immigration (see Marks and
Hooghe, 2003).
This study takes as its starting point the development from ‘hard’ predic-
tors of support, such as utilitarian considerations and economic expectations
(Gabel, 1998), to ‘soft’ predictors in the realm of cultural and identity-based
considerations. The article focuses on one of the most contentious issues in
contemporary Europe, the possible membership of Turkey in the EU. This
European Union Politics 9(4)5 2 2
Table 2 Direct, indirect and total effects for Turkish membership in the EU
Direct effects Indirect effects Total effects
Gender (female) .00 –.05 –.05
Age .00 –.00 –.00
Education .00 .08 .08
Income .00 .04 .04
Political sophistication .00 –.04 –.04
Ideology left .00 .08 .08
Ideology right –.08 –.08 –.17
Government evaluations .00 –.06 –.06
Economic evaluations .13 .04 .17
Post-materialism .06 .00 .06
Anti-immigration attitudes .37 .00 .37
Exclusive Dutch identity –.12 –.07 –.19
issue is particularly interesting because it touches on economic, political and
cultural dimensions. We specified and tested different models for explaining
variation in support. The first model, including structural sociodemographic
variables and ‘early contenders’ for explaining support (including Inglehart’s
sophistication and post-materialism theses), confirmed our expectations
based on previous research but explained only a negligible share of variance.
The inclusion of ideology indicated a particular negative effect of right-wing
ideology on support for Turkish membership. Including ‘hard’ predictors
such as economic expectations improved our model, but it was the inclusion
of ‘soft’ predictors such as feelings of identity and anti-immigration attitudes
that contributed most to explaining variation.
Moreover, our study demonstrated how the importance of economic
considerations is partially mediated by considerations with reference to immi-
gration. These findings point to the increased importance of soft predictors,
and also demonstrate that, in relation to an issue that touches on economic,
political, and social and cultural dimensions, the latter outweigh the first in
terms of importance for understanding public opinion. These are important
lessons to learn for the progress of European integration, where public
support is a necessity for the legitimacy of the project. That said, we acknowl-
edge the single-country limitation and the salience of immigration and 
integration issues in this country (see Hooghe et al., 2007).
Our study also found a negative, stable and significant effect of political
sophistication on support for Turkish membership. Political knowledge is an
important but ambiguous part of the equation. Inglehart (1970) suggested that
those with greater political skills were more likely to support European inte-
gration (see also Anderson, 1998). However, our finding is at odds with the
‘cognitive mobilization’ hypothesis as put forward by Inglehart. We suggest
that the straightforward relationship between political sophistication and EU
support is no longer applicable (see also Karp et al., 2003). Indeed political
sophistication may foster a greater awareness of the qualities of the EU and,
even though general knowledge about the EU is low, it might be the case that
those with some knowledge are less satisfied with or supportive of European
integration. In the case of support for European democracy, Karp et al. (2003)
offer an explanation for why this might be the case: political sophisticates
may know that the European Parliament is not analogous to their national
parliament and they might be more aware of and concerned about questions
of accountability and system responsiveness. On the issue of Turkey, it might
be the case that, as knowledge grows, evaluations of the future plans of the
EU are more strongly rooted in the past performance of the EU, which might
not always be seen as a good performance.
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We consider our study to be a modest but important addition not just to
our understanding of public opinion on European integration. It also provides
the baseline knowledge needed to understand what drives changes in public
support. Here we are well advised to turn also to the role of the political elites
and the media and their framing of the issue. As has been shown, media
coverage can lead to shifts in public support (De Vreese and Boomgaarden,
2006). Given the importance of considerations such as identity and sentiments
vis-à-vis foreigners, we need to take a broader view when analysing media
content in order to understand change in public support. News coverage both
of the economy and of immigration and integration issues can be part of the
answer in addition to real world developments. Finally, we point to the
necessity to include more and better indicators in surveys aimed at under-
standing public opinion about Europe. Our study comes with the advantage
of including most relevant indicators but at the price of investigating the
relationships in one country only.
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Appendix: Table A1
Mean SD alpha
Gender 1 = female .45 .50
What is your gender?
Age 16 to 89 49.11 15.42
How old are you?
Education 6 = high 3.57 1.50
What is your highest completed degree?
1 Primary school
6 University degree
Income 4 = high 2.96 .97
What is your average monthly household income?
1 < EUR 1150,–
2 EUR 1150,– to 1800,–
3 EUR 1800,– to 2600,–
4 > EUR 2600,–
Ideology left 1 = left .35 .48
On a scale from 1 to 10, where one is very left and 
10 is very right, what is your ideological leaning?
(1, 2, 3 = 1, ELSE = 0)
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Appendix: Table A1 continued
Mean SD alpha
Ideology right 1 = right .33 .47
On a scale from 1 to 10, where one is very left and 
10 is very right, what is your ideological leaning?
(8, 9, 10 = 1, ELSE = 0)
Postmaterialism 4 = high 2.14 .91
How important do you think the following tasks are for 
government?
1 keeping order (materialist)
2 more citizen involvement (postm.)
3 handle inflation (materialist)
4 freedom of speech (postm.)
1 least important
2 somewhat important
3 important
4 very important
(recoded into scale from 1 to 4)
Political Sophistication 5 = high 3.03 1.25
Weighed additive index of political knowledge and 
interest.
How interested are you in politics?
1 not at all – 4 very interested
How many countries are EU members?
What is the name of the Dutch EU commissioner?
What is the name of the EU president?
Which party won the EP elections in NL?
Exclusive Dutch identity 1 = yes .57 .50
How do you see your own identity?
Dutch only
Dutch and a little bit European
European and a little bit Dutch
European only
Government evaluation 5 = good 2.49 .99
How, in your opinion, is the present government 
handling the job?
Turkey in EU support 5 = positive 2.70 .90
How do you think about possible membership of 
Turkey in the EU?
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Appendix: Table A1 continued
Mean SD alpha
Immigration index 5 = high 3.02 1.02 .84
Additive index of six items. Answers on 5-point 
agree-disagree scale.
Immigration is good for the job market (recoded).
The religious practices of immigrants threaten the 
Dutch way of life.
Immigration is an important cause of crime in the 
Netherlands.
Immigration contributes positively to Dutch culture 
(recoded).
Immigrants misuse our welfare system.
Immigrants are a threat to security.
Economic evaluation 5 = good 2.95 .82
How do you think will the Dutch economy develop in 
the coming 12 months?
Appendix: Table A2
A
——————————————————
B SE
Intercept 3.085 .017
Gender (female) –.007 .017
Age .005 .018
Education .064*** .018
Income .013 .018
Political sophistication –.024 .019
Ideology left .017 .021
Ideology right –.018 .020
Government evaluations .119*** .020
Economic evaluations .125*** .018
Post-materialism .048** .017
Anti-immigration attitudes –.134*** .019
Exclusive Dutch identity –.213*** .018
Adjusted R-square .244
N 1630
Notes
We acknowledge support from ASCoR and Emory University for this study.
1 The start of negotiations was a highly contested issue. The EU summit had
to be prolonged to reach agreement, whereby it was decided to start nego-
tiations on 3 October 2005. To counter concerns about a pre-set outcome of
the negotiations (namely the rather ‘automatic’ accession of Turkey in the
end), a clause was added stating that the outcome of the negotiations was
open and would not necessarily lead to the accession of Turkey.
2 The specific fieldwork days were 14–18 November.
3 Our dependent variable was chosen after analysis of data collected among a
separate sample (n = 45) in which a six-item index tapping support for
Turkish membership was employed. The six items formed a reliable scale
(alpha = .75) but, more importantly, the item used as a dependent variable
in this study performed virtually identically (in terms of means and distri-
bution) compared with the index. Given that all components of the index also
correlated positively with the general item, we, for obvious reasons of space
and financial constraints, utilized the general single item in this study.
4 Byrne (2001) advises cut-off values of .90 for the CFI and .50 for the index
considering parsimony; i.e. values below .90 and .50, respectively, indicate an
insufficient model fit. An RMSEA below .05 indicates a good model fit and
below .08 an acceptable fit (Hair et al., 1998). PCLOSE indicates the prob-
ability that the RMSEA value is below .05.
5 What happens if we include only attitudinal variables in the model? 
This exploratory analysis shows that using economic evaluations, post-
materialism, anti-immigration attitudes and government evaluations yields
an only marginally worse model than the complete one discussed previously,
with an explained variance of 21%. In this model, government evaluations
turn out to be a non-significant variable. Further, a model including only 
anti-immigration sentiments and economic evaluations still yields 21%
explained variance. Again, the impact of anti-immigration attitudes is about
three times as strong as the impact of economic evaluations, pointing towards
the strong relevance of including this soft factor in explanatory models of 
EU support.
6 The correlation between general EU support and support for Turkish
accession is r = .41, p < .01. If general EU support is entered as a control
variable in the regression models explaining support for Turkey in the EU,
the explanatory value of the models increases; however, the effects of the vari-
ables of interest remain stable.
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